Does subjectivism in value theory – the view that value is grounded on attitudes – imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes?
• Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude?
• Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake?
• Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value?
• Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable?
• Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people?
• Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism?
• Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism?
• Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz- Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.